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ABSTRACT 
Threats to our country have never been more real, nor had more potential to impact large 
populations of Americans.  From the homeland defense perspective, some ideology-based 
groups have the ability and intention to attack the United States in ways that we as a 
nation have never imagined.  As our world grows more complex and unpredictable, our 
first responders need tools to enable them to operate in this space. 
This thesis focuses on how decisions are made in complex novel environments.  
Using Grounded Theory methodology, interviews were conducted with public safety 
personnel who had past experience managing incidents that matched the study criteria.  
Aspects of Complexity Theory and Recognition-Primed Decision Making were identified 
as core components.  
Based on these findings, a descriptive process model was developed that modifies 
the existing Recognition-Primed Decision Making model in order to account for novel 
situations, in addition to those cases where the decision maker has previous experience. 
The Exploration and Exploitation Decision Making model (Ex2DM) is based on actual 
practices by both law enforcement and fire-rescue professionals. With an understanding 
of the unique characteristics of complex environments and how decisions are made under 
these conditions, public safety personnel will be better prepared to manage complex 
incidents. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 and Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, management of large-scale complex incidents has come to the forefront 
of public debate (Thomas & Beckel, 2005) and has instigated organizational change at 
the federal level (Bea et al., 2006). While it is generally understood that managing such 
situations is not an easy task, the public expects first responders to be able to manage 
even the most complex incidents effectively.   
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2008, pp. 2–24), 
complex incidents include a combination of factors that affect the ability to control an 
incident. Such factors can include:  
• Community and responder safety 
• Impacts to life, property, and the economy 
• Potential hazardous materials 
• Weather and other environmental influences 
• Likelihood of cascading effects 
• Potential crime scene 
• Political sensitivity, external influences, and media relations 
• Area involved, jurisdictional boundaries 
• Availability of resources 
• Potential to extend multiple operational periods  
Multiple complicating factors pertaining to an incident (such as those listed 
above) increase the number of potential unknowns, creating a situation in which it is 
difficult to predict outcomes. This is the definition of complex in its most basic sense. For 
those working in complex circumstances, creating mental simulations of possible 
outcomes in any environment is difficult (Klein, 1998)—it is even more so without a 
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framework to organize the complexity. Ambiguity, time limits, and excessive noise all 
can act as stressors. While stress in and of itself does not cause low-quality decision 
making,1 stressors distract the decision maker, inhibiting the ability to gather and process 
information (Klein, 1998). 
And yet, under these conditions, first responders are responsible for 
comprehending the incident environment and quickly determining the required steps to 
stabilize the situation.  As Boin et al. notes:  
In a dynamic and volatile situation, windows of opportunity to intervene 
are often fleeting.  Decisions as to whether and how to act or not must be 
made rapidly or the possibility to affect the course of events may be lost. 
(2005, p. 29) 
First responders working under these conditions must maintain mental 
functionality, including understanding the context of the incident, what problems must be 
solved, and what actions to take (Weick, 1995).  Even when experience offers no 
parallels of reference, and previously prepared plans and procedures do not seem to 
apply, the men and women responsible for managing complex incidents must find a way 
to operate within the chaos. 
B. RESEARCH FOCUS 
This research focuses on how decisions are made in the realm of the complex and 
novel. For the purposes of this work, a system is complex “when there are strong 
interactions among its elements, so that current events heavily influence the probabilities 
of many kinds of later events” (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000, p. 7). A public safety incident is 
considered a complex system when there are multiple mitigating factors with the 
potential to interact in many ways, making it difficult to predict a likely outcome.  
Relationships between the complicating factors may be discernible in hindsight, but not 
during or before the incident.  
 
1 High quality decisions are defined as satisfying procedural criteria, and have a better chance than 
others of obtaining the decision makers’ objectives. Low quality decision making would then be the 
opposite, decisions that are less likely to obtain the decision makers’ objectives. 
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Examples of complexity can range from a single-person rescue to the 2004 train 
bombings in Madrid.  In both cases, there are many factors that affect incident 
stabilization.  For a rescue, mitigating factors may be where the person is stranded, or if it 
is difficult for rescuers to gain access.  In the Madrid bombing, incident stabilization was 
challenged by the fact that it occurred on a mass transit system during rush hour, ensuring 
a large number of victims (Gardiner & Phillips, 2005). In both cases, there is no clear 
predictable outcome, especially during the initial incident response. The rescue victim 
may be successfully extracted or may die due to delays in getting access to the site.  For 
Madrid, it was unclear at the time exactly how many bombs there were, and if more 
would be detonated while the rescue response was underway.  It is not the scale of the 
incident that makes it complex, it is the potential for unexpected outcomes. 
For an incident to be deemed “novel” in this research, the most impactful 
circumstances of the incident, as defined by the primary decision maker for the incident 
(commonly called the incident commander) were neither previously encountered during 
an actual incident nor practiced or studied in training. Opinions vary widely on the 
concept of novelty, especially when discussing incident command.  Some would say that 
every incident is unique with no two the same; there are always differences in the 
circumstances that have the potential to change outcomes.  In considering two residential 
fires, the fires may have started in different parts of the home, have different fuels in the 
house affecting fire behavior, etc. In some cases, it may be appropriate to knock a hole in 
the roof, in others it may not. From this perspective, each incident must be considered 
individually when determining appropriate tactics.  
Another school of thought is that novel incidents are extremely rare; that in fact, 
there are very few circumstances that are truly unique.  An example from law 
enforcement is a routine traffic stop.  While the particulars may vary, the policies and 
procedures of how to approach the vehicle and engage its passengers are the same. As 
long as a person is trained adequately to the standardized procedures based on the most 
common scenarios, they are unlikely to encounter a situation where some form of training 
and procedures could not be applied.  
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These two points of view represent two extreme ends of a spectrum, with 
individual opinions varying along the spectrum. Either way, it is the opinion of the person 
experiencing the incident that matters.  If he believes the situation to be significantly 
different than previous experience, he may have troubles applying previous knowledge to 
the situation in order to determine how best to proceed. Also, regardless of one’s personal 
opinions of novelty, standardized procedures and learned tactics are important. Even in a 
novel circumstance, it may be appropriate to apply them. However, an incident 
commander must be able to incorporate new ideas for those circumstances where 
previous tactics are not appropriate.   
As part of this research study, inductive methods will be used to gain a better 
understanding of how the decision making process is affected under these circumstances. 
The intended result of this research is the development of a process model that describes 
how decisions are made when complex novel situations occur. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What is the process for making decisions in complex novel situations? 
D. ARGUMENT 
Threats to our country have never been more real, nor had more potential to 
impact large populations of Americans.  From the homeland defense perspective, some 
ideology-based groups have the ability and intention to attack the United States in ways 
that we as a nation have never imagined.  As our world grows more complex and 
unpredictable, our first responders need tools to enable them to operate in this space. 
For incident commanders who do not have direct experience, and yet must 
operate under the circumstance of extreme complexity, previous theories of decision 
making have significant weaknesses.  Analytical systematic processing of information 
takes too much time to find the best solution.  Naturalistic decision making using the 
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model fails in theory if there is a lack of experience 
or when encountering a completely novel scenario.   
While some may assert there is never a situation where an experienced decision 
maker cannot find a past experience to draw upon, this claim fails to recognize the very 
 5
real possibility that the most experienced first responder on scene may be relatively new 
to the occupation and still be required to manage the incident until a more experienced 
person takes command.   
A second counter argument to this challenge is the evolving threat of terrorism, 
with its potential to attack in ways we have never encountered before.  Many of our 
nation’s first responders have little or no experience managing incidents while under 
attack, when the potential for novel incidents is the greatest. The threat of an unknown 
and unpredictable adversary can incite panic in both the responder and the public they are 
charged with protecting, creating an environment never imagined, let alone experienced 
or planned for. 
“Sensemaking is tested to the extreme when people encounter an event whose 
occurrence is so implausible that they hesitate to report it for fear they will not be 
believed” (Weick, 1995, p. 1). Inability to comprehend a complex situation can cause 
uncertainty in the decision maker.  This occurs when key pieces of information are 
missing, unreliable, ambiguous, inconsistent, or too complex to interpret. The result will 
be a reluctance to act (Klein, 1998). In complex incidents, time is a key factor to 
regaining control of the situation, and reluctance to act wastes valuable time. One might 
ask, is just making sense of the situation enough to overcome this reluctance?  If first 
responders can observe the environment and orient themselves, they have overcome the 
major obstacle of making a decision: overload.   
Effective incident commanders have been found to have three common qualities 
(McLennon, Holgate, & Wearing): 
1. Work in a manner not to exceed their own working memory capacity 
2. Monitor and regulate their emotions and arousal level 
3. Take into consideration subordinate’s working memory capacity  
Essentially, they are aware of and able to manage overload in themselves and 
others, ensuring that the incident response team is operating at maximum mental 
capacity. First responders want to find solutions and manage the situation; this ability is 
limited due to excess arousal.   
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A lack of previous experience with a situation does not necessarily lead to 
reluctance to act.  If the first responder can detect patterns and find meaning in the 
complexity without relying completely on experience,2 then a singular systematic 
approach to evaluating options could be utilized to evaluate potential actions and make a 
decision that satisfies the conditions quickly.  The benefit of this concept is that it 
incorporates a naturalistic decision making model, developed by studying first responders 
in the field, without being held to the limitation of experience.   The decision-making 
process for the incident commander does not change; the commander simply has 
additional knowledge to draw upon. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
A considerable amount of research has been conducted regarding the ability to 
process information and make decisions.  Where the research falls short, however, is in 
considering situations so complex commanders might find themselves lacking the ability 
to comprehend the environment in which they are working. This is worrisome, especially 
as the world becomes more interdependent, increasing the potential for any incident to 
become complex.   
Fifty years ago, a hurricane hitting the gulf coast would have been a tragedy in 
lost lives and damaged property; it is now an incident of national significance.3  In 
today’s world, people are connected in ways without precedence. With our global 
economy, a storm’s impact to oil fields in the golf can have a ripple effect impacting all 
Americans. The technology revolution has led to a greater connectedness by increasing 
the speed of accomplishing tasks.  Combined, this translates to more people impacted by 
a single event, realizing its effects almost immediately.  
 
2 All first responders deployed in the field have some level of experience and training.  It is the 
author’s assertion that in certain novel scenarios, the training or experience may not be directly applicable 
or comprehensive enough to fully address, develop a response, and predict outcomes solely on experience. 
3 An Incident of National Significance (INS) is an actual or potential high-impact event that requires 
robust coordination of the federal response system in order to save lives and minimize damage, and 
provides the basis for long-term community and economic recovery. The Secretary of Homeland Security, 
in consultation with other departments and agencies, and the White House, as appropriate, declares 
Incidents of National Significance. Note that as of January 2008, this declaration has been eliminated. 
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From a homeland defense perspective, asymmetrical threats are real and have 
already led to attacks to our nation in ways Americans have never imagined.  In complex 
situations, the training, experience, and cognitive methods currently used by first 
responders to manage an incident may not apply. This research addresses this potential 
problem by building a descriptive model of how decisions are made in novel scenarios. 
Emergency managers and fire, police, and EMS command staff can all benefit directly 
from understanding the decision making process. As our world grows more complex and 
unpredictable, our first responders need tools that enable them to operate in this space.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Decisions are made every day. We decide what to eat, what to wear, and who we 
should vote for in the next election.  Some decisions we ponder and look at all options to 
find the very best one.  Other times, we do what is called satisficing,4 which is searching 
for the first good option that will work, even if it is not the very best option available. 
How do we determine the appropriate process? Often times, it is influenced by the 
context of the decision maker. Are they in a hurry and need to make a decision fast, or do 
they have time to really study the issue? In looking at the literature on this topic, there are 
significant gaps in the literature regarding the “situational impacts of actual decision 
making” (O'Reilly, 1980, p. 687).  While this comment was made 30 years ago, a review 
of the literature shows a continued gap, especially pertaining to complex novel 
environments. 
In today’s environment of large-scale natural disasters and terrorist threats, even 
the most seasoned incident commander has the potential to become overwhelmed and 
experience stress. According to Boin et al., stress entails a relationship between task load 
and the coping capacity of the individual or collective. Stress need not necessarily 
degrade performance, cognitive or otherwise, if the task load is balanced with a high 
degree of coping capacity.  
Boin et al. found that under stress, an individual’s abilities are impacted in the 
following ways: 
• Individuals focus on the short term 
• Fall back to old behavioral patterns 
• Narrow and deepen span of attention 
• Rely on stereotypes or lapse into fantasies 
• Easily irritable 
 
4 This term is credited to H.A. Simon’s Administrative Behavior (1976) but was discussed in Irving 
Janis’ Crucial Decisions, p. 37. 
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Evaluation of solutions to improve situational assessments in complex 
environments must assume the decision maker is operating under stress, and take into 
consideration these factors. To be clear, stress does not necessarily result in faulty 
decision making. It may, however, limit the information one is able to consider (Klein, 
1998). One common impact of stress is overload: the inability to process information 
within a defined timescale.  Overload can manifest in multiple ways, including extreme 
visual clarity, tunnel vision, diminished sound, and the sense that time is slowing down. 
The human brain drastically limits the amount of information we have to deal with 
(Gladwell, 2005). It is a situation where the inability to process information leads to 
inferior decisions due to lack of pertinent information.  While one cannot ignore the 
body’s default responses to stress, it is important to find ways to mitigate this stress for 
the incident commander. 
A common theme discussed in the literature is the role of the unconscious in the 
task of orienting.  When considering our mind as a well-designed efficient system, the 
unconscious is actively monitoring and assessing the world outside, often without us even 
realizing it is doing so (Wilson, 2002).  Wilson asserts it is possible to shape and change 
our unconscious behavior through conscious self awareness and purposeful changes in 
behavior to train the unconscious.  Building on this concept, Klein suggests fire 
commanders have a rich fantasy life where they mentally simulate potential attacks and 
decide how they would combat them (Weick, 1995).  This practice of imaging a situation 
and how they would manage it allows commanders to grow experience that will be stored 
in the unconscious without having to encounter an actual incident.  Gladwell agrees, 
stating “spontaneity isn’t random. … How good people’s decisions are under the fast-
moving, high-stress conditions of rapid cognition is a function of training rules, and 
rehearsal” (Gladwell, 2005, p. 114).   
Another key inhibitor to orientation or sensemaking in complex environments is 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is doubt that threatens to block action. This doubt can manifest 
when key pieces of information are missing, unreliable, ambiguous, or too complex to 
interpret. As a result, the decision maker will be hesitant to act (Klein, 1998). It is this 
hesitancy that incident commanders strive to avoid. Weick asserts that in order to manage 
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the unexpected, one must remain mindful.  He defines this as “striving to maintain an 
underlying style of mental functioning that is distinguished by continuous updating and 
deepening of increasingly plausible interpretations of what the context is, what problems 
define it, and what remedies it contains” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 18).  
Understanding the environment around us, making sense of the information available is 
critical to decision making.  If incident commanders are not mindful, or able to 
comprehend external inputs from the incident environment and place them in context, 
then their ability to make a determination based on their judgment is compromised.  
One school of thought regarding decision-making processes was that people made 
decisions using a rational analytical process of decision making,5 gathering multiple 
options for action systematically, simultaneously evaluating risks associated with each 
option, and selecting the least risky option.  Janis, however, disrupted this body of 
knowledge stating, “the rational actor model does not stand up very well as a descriptive 
theory” due to cognitive constraints including lack of time, lack of expertise, and lack of 
resources (1989, p. 13).  Instead, Janis stated that the appropriateness of simplistic 
decision rules is situation specific. 
Later, in the mid-1990s, Gary Klein built upon Janis’ work and developed a 
model of naturalistic decision making where decision makers use past experience to make 
decisions in field settings, called Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) making. 
According to Klein, for experienced decision makers, certain situations lend themselves 
for naturalist decision making, including: 
• Time Pressure 
• High Stakes 
• Experienced decision makers 
• Inadequate information 
• Ill-defined goals 
• Poorly defined procedures 
 
5 See Chapter V, Figure 8, for a diagram of the Rational Analytical decision-making process. 
 12
                                                
• Cue learning 
• Context 
• Dynamic conditions 
• Team coordination 
Under these conditions, decision makers often use a singular evaluation approach. 
A single option is selected, often based on past experience, evaluated as plausible, and 
selected if it is determined to potentially satisfy the conditions. Options are developed 
and evaluated one at a time.  If the first option does not satisfy the context of the problem, 
then another option is evaluated, one by one, until a satisfactory solution is found.  This 
method was supported by research done at this same time by Weick, who studied highly 
reliable organizations, including fire departments, and found commanders use their past 
experiences and then visually model potential outcomes (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Both 
Janis and Klein believe naturalistic decision making occurs due to time constraints and a 
lack of complete information. The rational analytical model is rendered impossible, 
because there simply is not enough time or information to develop and evaluate a set of 
options.  Under these constraints, decisions are based on satisficing, not optimizing. 
Figure 1 shows the how the differences in context determine the types of decision making 
used. 
A key component of the naturalistic  process is how an individual makes sense of 
the situation.  Klein proposes RPD, where a person uses experience to recognize patterns 
and quickly develop satisfactory solutions.6 Decision makers draw on memories of past 
incidents, solutions tested, and final outcomes. They imagine how similar tactics might 
be applied to the current scenario. This theory fails in a scenario where lack of experience 
or incident complexity leaves the decision maker unable to draw on past experiences in 
order to make sense of the situation.  
 
 
6 See Chapter V, Figure 9, for a diagram of the RPD process. 
Figure 1.   Differences in Decision Making Based on Stress and Time Constraints 
Boin et al. state that “if the situation is radically different from those stored in 
memory, a somewhat different kind of sense-making process will be necessary” (2005, p. 
36). Boin et al. never provide a definition or description of sensemaking in this complex 
scenario, representing a gap in the knowledge concerning this topic.  Klein recommends 
novices or decision makers in extremely complex situations use the systematic rational 
analytical process (Klein, 1998).  However, this solution does not apply even with 
applicable past experience. If rational analytical decision making is too slow for complex 
situations, how can it possibly be viable for extremely complex environments or less 
experienced personnel?  
In reviewing the literature, how one orients to their surroundings is of critical 
importance in the study of decision making in novel situations.  Orientation is the 
independent variable upon which all other steps of the decision-making process depend.  
It is also the most subjective since orientation includes personal experience, culture, 
rules, and situation specific data from the incident environment.  In order to maximize the 
orientation process, it is important that the incident commander is not experiencing 
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overload and is instead mindful. When making decisions, naturalistic decision-making 
models using singular option evaluation are preferred over rational analytical methods.  
When subjected to stress and time pressure, it is better to satisfy rather than optimize.  As 
shown in the literature, this poses a problem if the situation is novel for the incident 
commander.  A gap in the knowledge exists as to whether one can use naturalistic 
decision-making methods without pertinent experience to recognize patterns of expected 
behavior and associate with past outcomes.  
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III. INDUCTIVE PROCESS AND GROUNDED THEORY 
The result sought at the culmination of this project is the development of a 
process model to describe how decisions are made in complex and novel situations. To 
best achieve this goal, the qualitative research method of grounded theory was selected. 
Grounded theory was developed by Glauser and Straus in 1967 as a formal method meant 
to be an opposite of the logico-deductive methods prominent in social sciences at that 
time (Glauser & Strauss, 1967).  Instead of verifying a theory, grounded theory discovers 
new theories through the study of data and inductive analysis. The process of performing 
grounded theory is “iterative, messy, and ambiguity-laden” (Locke, 2001, p. 50) but 
revolves around the following steps: 
1. Sampling 
2. Creating and organizing conceptual categories 
3.  Reducing to focus on relevant and robust findings based on achieving  
  theoretical saturation 
4. Development of a substantive theoretical model in the form of a process 
model 
Following the grounded theory standard, the selection of subjects for this research 
was far from random.  Instead, public safety professionals were selected based on 
whether they had held a position of responsibility in the past where they were responsible 
for making decisions during an active incident that could be typed as both complex and 
novel. Coding, comparison analysis, and the drafting of research notes regarding data 
gathered from the research subjects were all used to identify key characteristics of the 
decision-making process. Figure 2 shows an example of how a comment made during the 
interview process is categorized and reduced, moving from a quote made by the research 
subject, through the multiple levels of coding, to classification as support for a concept. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Example of the Coding Process 
Research was then conducted comparing existing literature on decision making 
and complexity theory to key concepts identified during the coding process. Whether the 
concepts mesh or contrast with existing theories, it is still important for the researcher to 
understand how their work fits into existing bodies of knowledge. This study of 
prominent concepts, and the ensuing comparisons, was used to further refine analysis of 
the data collected. The result is a model based on actual experiences by decision makers 
in the field, supported by academic bodies of knowledge.   
The proposed model developed through this process was then analyzed for 
usefulness and credibility. Finally, the document concludes with a discussion of how the 
proposed hypothesis may be practically applied, an analysis of its limitations, and 
suggestions for future research. 
A. ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER IN GROUNDED THEORY 
In Grounded Theory, the researcher plays a direct role in shaping the research as a 
whole.  Unlike other methodologies, where the researcher is purposefully isolated from 
the research so as not to affect results with personal biases, grounded theory accepts the 
background and perspective of the researcher as an integral part of the research process. 
As a civilian employee of police and fire agencies in the San Diego area over the 
past 12 years, the author has had the opportunity work with many of the men and women 
who manage complex incidents in San Diego County. This contact has occurred during 
incidents, exercises, day-to-day operations, or as part of regional committees. Because 
the author lives and works in the area from where the majority of the research subjects 
were selected, she had an indirect role in or knowledge of some of the incidents discussed 
during the interview process. These biases directly shape this research project.  To 
partially mitigate this bias, the coding process was validated with direct quotes and 
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examples from the interviews, ensuring the raw data supported the general themes 
identified as the data was progressively reduced to general themes.  If the themes could 
not be supported by direct quote or example, they were eliminated from the sample set.  
B. INTERVIEW PROCESS 
Selecting samples to study in grounded theory is not random. Instead, the 
researcher is encouraged to actively search for data that will “best support the 
development of the theoretical framework” (Locke, 2001, p. 55).  Interviews were 
conducted with personnel in the policing and fire-rescue disciplines. Incidents discussed 
were selected by the interviewees themselves.  Prior to the interview, they were asked to 
identify one or two incidents in their past experience that they considered complex and 
novel and to be prepared to talk through those experiences. Advanced notification of the 
topic allowed the interviewees to identify their incidents and reflect on the experiences in 
preparation for the interview discussions. 
Because the interviewer did not assist in the selection of the incidents discussed, 
the terms “novel” and “complex” were defined by the research subjects themselves. As 
noted in Chapter I, there are varying opinions regarding what constitutes novelty in a 
public safety incident, and this was reflected in the incidents selected by the research 
subjects. While all incidents discussed were linked to the subjects trained discipline, each 
example discussed had some feature that made it unlike any specific training the subject 
had received and was considered sufficiently complex to qualify, in their minds, as 
applicable to the research.  The very fact that the commander who experienced the 
incident believed it was novel and complex made the experience pertinent to this study. 
1.  Selection of Research Subjects 
Nine public safety professionals were identified through known contacts of the 
researcher in San Diego County.  All, with the exception of one, work within San Diego 
County.  Research subjects were solicited for this project in two ways: solicitation 
through a regional public safety working group, and direct requests for interviews. At the 
regional meeting, the research topic was presented to the entire committee and interested 
parties were asked to contact the researcher if they wanted to participate.  Additionally, 
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some were selected specifically by the researcher based on personal knowledge of their 
career performance managing complex incidents.  Of the nine volunteer research 
subjects, two asked to remain anonymous and will not be identified by name or agency. 
2.  Conducting Interviews 
Eight of the nine interviews were conducted in person.  The ninth interview was 
conducted over the telephone.  In all cases, the interviews were recorded with the 
permission of the research subjects and transcribed.  Interviewees were asked to sign an 
informed consent form, which outlined the basic topic of the research, and were asked in 
advance to identify one or two incidents that they considered complex and novel prior to 
the interview.  While the researcher had a predeveloped list of interview questions, the 
interviews were conducted in a free-form format, with the interview questions used only 
to ensure that topics of interest were covered. 
Following each interview, written notes were compiled to document ideas 
resulting from the interview.  Similarities and differences from previous interviews were 
of particular interest. These written notes from the interviews were guided by the research 
question, existing knowledge of the researcher gathered while conducting the initial 
literature review, and of course, the researcher’s bias as discussed previously in this 
chapter. These notes constituted the initial step in analyzing the interview data to begin to 
see patterns, which would be further refined through the coding process. 
C.  CODING AND ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS 
1. Open Coding 
Open coding was used to identify common themes in the data collected. It is the 
process where the researcher searches transcripts, field notes, and other texts for meaning 
units, which they label.  These labels are the codes (Gilgun, 2004).  The coding process is 
purely subjective, decided upon by the researcher based on the area of interest for the 
research as well as the researcher’s personal biases. In this case, the researcher wrote 
brief notes in the margins of the interview transcripts and field notes with ideas and 
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concepts she found pertinent to the research focus.  A collection of 266 codes were 
developed during this process (see Appendix A for the complete list). 
2. Axial Coding 
Using the list of codes developed in the step above, the codes were next analyzed 
for common themes.  The themes were generated by isolating the codes from the initial 
transcripts and field notes, and looking for ways to organize the data. “Induction is the 
movement from data to concepts” (Gilgun, 2004). In examining the initial codes, 33 
themes were determined by the researcher (see Appendix B for the complete list). Once 
the 33 themes were created, the next step was to see how many codes were related to 
each theme in order to further categorize the themes based on prevalence in the original 
data. Finally, the 33 themes were further reduced to two relevant concepts.  
D. RESEARCH BASED ON TOPICS IDENTIFIED DURING INTERVIEWS 
The third step in Grounded Theory research is the reduction of the focus to 
relevant and robust findings. The two primary concepts identified during the interview 
coding process, RPD and Complexity Theory, were selected by the researcher as the most 
pertinent findings from the interview data. Grounded Theory research emphasizes the 
need to gather data not only from real-life examples, but also to remain firmly grounded 
in the existing body of academic knowledge.  In order to better understand both RPD and 
Complexity Theory, a literature review focused on these two topics was conducted. 
E. DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF THE MODEL 
“Interpretive paradigms are distinguished by an interest in understanding the 
world of lived experience from the point of view of those who lived it” (Glauser & 
Strauss, 1967, p. 8). The final step in this study was the creation of a process model based 
on actual experience and supported by existing academic knowledge.  The model was 
then evaluated against both the research question, and Glauser and Strauss’ criteria for 
usefulness of new ideas developed through the inductive Grounded Theory methodology: 
 Enable prediction and explanation of behavior 
 Be useful in theoretical advancement in the subject 
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 Be useful in practical solutions 
 Provide perspective on behavior 
 Guide and provide style for more research 
Just as the research methodology incorporated both real-life experiences and 
academic research, the end result should also benefit both real-life practitioners, as well 
as advance overall academic knowledge in the subject matter. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. INCIDENTS DISCUSSED DURING THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
The following is a brief overview of each of the incidents discussed during the 
interview process. 
1.  Lieutenant Tom Leonard, Chula Vista Police Department (Retired) 
Lt Leonard discussed two incidents, both associated with his time as a police 
officer with the Chula Vista Police Department.  In the first incident, Lt Leonard was 
responding to a call for service at a second-story apartment building where a male was 
reportedly high on drugs and going crazy in the house.  Upon arrival, he found the male 
standing in broken glass in the sill of a bay window.  The solution finally selected was to 
shoot the man with water out of the window and into the apartment using a fire hose from 
an engine staged at the scene for medical aid.7  This incident was considered novel to Lt 
Leonard, because he had never before (or any time again in his career, for that matter) 
used a fire hose to control a situation.  It was complex because the man was on drugs and 
acting irrational, and therefore, it was difficult to predict his actions.  Tactics that may 
have worked on someone not in this mental state could not be applied in this situation 
because it was impossible to predict how the man would react.  There was a high 
likelihood that this man would be injured or even killed if the wrong tactic was chosen, 
which added stress to the situation. 
Lt Leonard discussed a second incident during the interviews where he and two 
other individuals were asked to break into a house to check on a diabetic person who 
might be in trouble.  They were checking the apartment, when the man jumped out at 
them in a crazed state, brandishing a shot gun with his finger on the trigger. Lt Leonard 
was approximately 12 feet from the man and directly in his line of sight.  While Lt 
Leonard had trained in defense classes, he had never been in a situation before where he 
 
7 See Chapter V, Section D, for a more detailed study of this incident. 
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had to instinctively apply those tactics and therefore, he had difficulty predicting how the 
incident would end, though he realized that his death was a possible outcome. 
2.  Officer Lance Dormann, San Diego Police Department 
Officer Dormann decided to discuss an incident where he was a covering officer 
serving a warrant at a person’s house.  Three officers (including him) were let into the 
home by family members of the person of interest.  They were then shown to a bedroom 
where the man was sleeping.  All three officers entered the room and proceeded to try to 
wake the person and arrest him.  What Officer Dormann was not aware of at the time was 
that while they were in the bedroom, the family members had locked the door, trapping 
them inside the house. When the person being served became uncooperative, the family 
members blocked the officers into the room, and refused to let the police officers out of 
the room.  Officer Dormann considered and even tried different tactics to de-escalate the 
situation—to no avail—and finally had to call for backup.  Responding officers had to 
break a window to get into the home and help the officers trapped inside. 
This situation was novel to Officer Dormann, who had never experienced being 
trapped while on the job.  It was a complex situation mostly because the officers failed to 
realize the threats of the family members who let them into the home, but then proceeded 
to trap them inside. 
3.  Officer Sandi Lehan-Nichols, San Diego Police Department (Retired) 
Officer Lehan-Nichols discussed two incidents during the interview.  The first 
incident concerned a call for service to a residence where a woman was in a bathroom 
miscarrying a baby.  As the only female officer on scene before the paramedics arrived, 
Officer Lehan-Nichols was made responsible for taking care of the woman until help 
could arrive.  Though Officer Lehan-Nichols is a mother of three, she had never before 
been responsible for caring for a pregnant woman, especially one that was in distress as 
this woman was.  “It was one of those situations you are not supposed to ever see,” she 
said. The situation was complex, with two lives at stake and the lack of information about 
what was really happening. There was extreme pressure to keep both mother and baby 
safe until help could arrive. 
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The second incident was a response to a vehicle accident where the victim was a 
2-year-old child who had been hit by large sports utility vehicle that was backing out of a 
driveway.  What made this incident both novel and complex for Officer Lehan-Nichols 
was that the victim was such a young child. This made it difficult for her to disassociate 
her feelings and remain mindful.  Language was also a complicating factor because the 
victim’s family was hysterical and speaking Spanish, which Officer Lehan-Nichols had 
difficulty understanding. Without a clear understanding of what happened, it was 
challenging to determine how best to help the child who was still alive at the time, but 
later died at the hospital. 
4.  Anonymous Police Officer 
The fourth interview was with a police officer confronted with a mob after trying 
to make an arrest on the beach during a crowded holiday weekend.  With the hot summer 
sun, alcohol consumption, and a heightened police presence, the crowd became incensed 
by the arrest and quickly turned violent.  Even though the officer had worked at the beach 
before the day of the incident, he had never encountered a situation like this one where 
crowd control became such an issue that the officer felt unsafe.  This example qualifies as 
complex, but may not meet the standard of novelty defined in Chapter I.8 Specific details 
regarding the case and the officer that participated in the interview have been withheld at 
the officer’s request. However, all aspects of the interview were included in the coding 
process. 
5.  Anonymous Fire Chief 
In October 2003, San Diego County experienced four simultaneous fires, the 
largest of which was called the Cedar Fire and burned 273,246 acres. The Cedar fire 
alone was second-largest fire in California history9 (Keely, Fotheringham, & Moritz, 
 
8 As noted in Chapter I, the impression of novelty is subjective.  Each incident described by the 
research subjects was selected because they considered the situation to be novel.  However, this incident 
and others noted later in the chapter does not qualify as novel based on the definition used for this thesis.  
Incidents in the category of complex, but not necessarily novel, were included in the coding process. 
9 The largest fire in California history occurred in Santiago Canyon in 1889, burning approximately 
300,000 acres. 
 24
2004). No firefighter working on that incident had ever experienced a fire of that 
magnitude.  The fire burned simultaneously with 15 other fires throughout the state, 
burning 742,000 acres in one week and taxing limited resources. The Cedar fire was also 
particularly complex because it passed through multiple wildland areas into urban 
neighborhoods, necessitating coordinated evacuations and threatening a record number of 
structures.  As one of the hundreds of firefighters working this incident, the chief spoke 
about his experiences as a captain during the 2003 fires. His interview covered five days 
of experiences and decisions made as he commanded groups of firefighters in several 
parts of San Diego County. Because all professional firefighters are trained in wildland 
fire tactics, this incident is considered complex, but not novel. Due to the extreme loss 
caused by this fire, the chief has asked that his comments remain anonymous and that 
certain particulars of his interview not be detailed.  All aspects of the interview were 
included in the coding process. 
6.  Assistant Chief Brian Fennessy, San Diego Fire-Rescue 
Chief Fennessy chose to speak about his experiences as the City of San Diego’s 
Incident Commander and Operations Section Manager during the 2007 Fire Complex that 
occurred in San Diego County. The 2007 fires exceeded the 2003 fires that ravaged San 
Diego County in both intensity and duration, if not in total acreage (County of San Diego, 
2008). While Chief Fennessy had over 30 years of firefighting experience, this was his 
first major fire complex where he served as Incident Commander for part of the incident 
duration, even though he was junior to many of the chiefs he was leading.  There was 
extreme political and public pressure for the city to perform better than it had during the 
Cedar Fire in 2003.  This pressure to perform, combined with complex wind-driven fire 
behavior that caused smaller fires to join into larger and faster moving fires, made this 
incident complex for Chief Fennessy, but not necessarily novel. 
7.  Assistant Chief Jeff Carle, San Diego Fire-Rescue 
Chief Carle recalled a tanker fire incident.  A tanker truck full of fuel had 
overturned on a major San Diego city street. One of the two tanks was leaking fuel and 
had caught on fire. What made this incident especially complex (but not necessarily 
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novel) was the fact that burning fuel was leaking into a highly sensitive watershed 
nearby. Adding water to the flames was furthering the contamination.  A firefighting 
mission quickly became a hazardous materials incident due to the unique combination of 
complicating factors. 
8. Battalion Chief Tom Gardner (Retired), CAL FIRE 
Chief Gardner chose to speak about two incidents that occurred during his career.  
The first was one of his fires as a young captain, when a fire line broke and his crew was 
threatened.  The situation was made more complex because the crew did not have a radio 
and did not realize that they were in danger. Chief Gardner had to figure out how notify 
his crew of the unsafe conditions as well as find a way to help get them safe. 
The second incident Chief Gardner chose to talk about during the interviews 
occurred during the 2007 fire complex (the same fires Chief Fennessy discussed).  Chief 
Gardner focused on a specific tragedy that occurred on the first day of the fires, when an 
engine was burned over with the fire crew trapped inside.  Chief Gardner was in the 
state’s San Diego Emergency Coordination Center, which received the radio distress call 
from the trapped crew.  Any time a firefighter is trapped by fire, it is a traumatic 
experience for everyone listening.  Chief Gardner had the responsibility of identifying the 
crew in danger, where they were located, and how to get resources to the scene to rescue 
them.  This difficult job was complicated by the fact that the person on the radio 
identified themselves as belonging to a crew that wasn’t assigned to the fire.10 Chief 
Gardner had to find a way to identify the engine in distress without using their primary 
source of communications, the radio.11 “No one ever told me what to do when somebody 
got burned over and the policy book just had a list of phone numbers you are supposed to 
call.” 
 
10 The firefighter was a cover person that day working on an engine that was not her normal 
assignment.  When broadcasting her distress signal, she accidentally identified her normal engine 
assignment instead of the temporary assignment she was working on that day. 
11 Because of the close personal and often familial relationships within the fire service, Chief Gardner 
did not want to broadcast roll call information or the name of the person in distress over the radio for fear 
that information would cause undue stress on those who knew the person. 
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9.  Assistant Chief David Downey, Miami-Dade Fire Rescue 
Chief Downey discussed his time leading an Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) 
team in Haiti in January 2010 as a Task Force Leader.  While all task force leaders in the 
federal system have extensive experience and training, Haiti was different.  “This was 
unlike any disasters domestically or internationally in the sense that there was far more 
potential for live saves, something we haven’t experienced in the US&R system since its 
inception.”  Because of the scale of the destruction in the structures in Haiti, there were 
some circumstances where people were found but not able to be extracted. This also 
increased the complexity of the incident. The specific incident that Chief Downey 
discussed was a search for a live person. He decided to stop the search after several 
hours, without successfully locating and extracting the person. 
B.  CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES DISCOVERED 
While each individual event discussed during the interviews offers valuable 
examples of actual decision making under the pressures of an active incident, coding the 
interviews and research notes provided additional insight into the decision-making 
process. Through a multi-step process of indentifying relevant quotes from the 
interviews, and then refining the quotes into codes, themes, and finally, concepts, patterns 
and predominate themes were detected, which may not have been noted simply by 
reading through the interview transcripts. 
Each interview, and the associated research notes, was analyzed line by line using 
an open coding process. A total of 266 codes were identified and were further analyzed to 
reveal 33 general themes (see Table 1).  Figure 3 shows the breakdown of the themes by 
the number of times each theme was found in the open coding process (See Appendix A 








Theme Theme Description 
Control of the Situation The ability (or lack of) to direct or determine incident 
behavior. 
Control of Arousal The ability (or lack of) to maintain psychological and 
physiological activity during an incident.  
Open to the Environment Able and willing to receive and process inputs about 
the incident environment. 
Active Role in the Process Purposefully selecting to have an active rather than 
passive function in the decisions pertaining to the 
incident. 
Mental Simulation Ability to imagine the outcome of a decision. 
Collective Problem Solving Decision making involving inputs from more than 
one source. 
Perspective A choice of reference to sense, categorize, compare. 
Information A collection of facts. 
Trust To have confidence or faith in. 
Comfort in Unknown Situations A feeling of freedom or comfort when confronted 
with an experience or situation where there is a lack 
of facts or past frame of reference. 
Table 1.   Definition of Themes 
These ten themes constitute 72% of the codes identified, and were present in both 




Figure 3.   Common Themes by Occurrence 
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C.  DISCUSSION OF MOST COMMON THEMES IDENTIFIED DURING 
CODING ANALYSIS 
1.  Control the Situation 
Control of the situation was, by far, the most prominent theme during all of the 
interviews.  One police officer noted that differences between controlling specific people 
and controlling a larger crowd.  Crowds were by far more difficult to control and had the 
ability to change the dynamics of an incident very quickly and unexpectedly.  A fire chief 
discussing a major fire in San Diego’s history noted, “We weren’t going to put it out.  I 
knew that. The weather was going to dictate what this fire was going to do.”  This chief 
decided to focus on individual opportunities to save people and property when they 
presented themselves, instead of trying to stop a fire that was clearly out of control and 
would run its course regardless of tactics taken. 
In almost every interview, there were examples of factors that could be controlled 
by the decision maker and those that could not.  A common tactic was to isolate portions 
of the incident and inhibit interactions or chain reactions that could further disrupt the 
situation.  Police officers would try to isolate their people of interest from other people 
not directly related to the incident who could change the incident circumstances.  Fire 
commanders looked for natural barriers as ways to channel a fire into a more controllable 
path.  Interviews from both disciplines gave examples of controlling the incident just 
enough to get it to a stage where they could apply past experience and known successful 
tactics. 
2.  Control of Arousal 
Officer Lehan-Nichols noted how a lack of information or incorrect data can 
inhibit control of arousal.  In her example, she was responding to a pedestrian hit by a 
car, which at first seemed to be a routine call for service.  The information that was 
lacking, making the example complex and novel for her, was that it was a 2-year-old 
child and she would not have time to prepare herself emotionally for what she was about 
to see.   
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If I had known that it was a two-year-old girl who got run over by a car, I 
could have prepared, disassociated myself from the scene.  Not seen 
likenesses to my life. 
Other interviewees discussed their coping mechanisms and the importance of 
controlling their emotions while working an active incident.  Some would walk away for 
a moment and have a conversation with God, some turned themselves away from a visual 
sight that might upset them, others stressed the need to just keep focused on the task at 
hand until a appropriate time to digest the gravity of the situation.  “It is the citizen’s 
emergency.  It is our job, we owe it to them, to be professional, remain calm, and do the 
very best we can for the maximum number of people that we can affect,” stated Chief 
Carle.  
Managing the stress associated with a complex novel incident has a direct 
relationship to the ability to identify key factors of the incident and actively evaluate 
associated information.  The decision maker’s ability to take in information about his 
surroundings is critical to the decision-making process. This cannot happen if the 
decision maker is over-aroused to the point of overload. 
3.  Open to the Environment 
The relationship between the commander and the incident environment was a 
common theme in many successful examples given of decision making under complex 
and novel circumstances.  Lt Leonard gave an example of stepping away from an incident 
in order to think better,12 and overhearing a conversation where two people outside his 
organization were discussing their ideas for the problem he was working on. Lt Leonard 
believes that if he had not been listening and aware of his surroundings, it would have 
been very easy to have not heard or even ignored the conversation, therefore missing a 
great idea. Chief Downey illustrated how the incident environment includes not only 
external factors but also the condition of one’s team.  The commander must consider as 
many factors concerning the incident as possible, from monitoring incident progress, to 
 
 
12 See Chapter V, Section D, for a more detailed description of this incident. 
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understanding the people involved, to the political implications.  In a complex 
environment, this is difficult as the number of unknowns may very likely outnumber the 
known. 
4.  Active Role in the Process 
Another common theme of the commanders interviewed was their conscious 
decision to take an active role in the decision-making process despite their inexperience 
in the situation.  Lt Leonard was only a sergeant at the time of the incident he discussed.  
At this incident, there was a lieutenant on scene who offered several possible courses of 
action for getting a man out of a window sill. Even though he was outranked, Lt Leonard 
repeatedly rejected the suggestions offered by his superior after evaluating each one, 
because the risk of injury was too great for the person in the window.  Instead of letting a 
ranking officer proceed with a bad decision, Lt Leonard actively searched for a 
reasonable alternative that later proved to be successful.   
A fire captain who had only held this rank for a short time prior to the beginning 
of the Southern California 2007 fires noted: 
We were listening to the radio, hearing guys I work with.  We were 
listening to evacuations and the fact that there were probably people that 
were going to die.  I had a month of planned vacation, I was off, I was 
gone as far as they knew.  And yet I felt I had to go to work.  There was a 
sense of duty.   
Even though this captain was on leave from his department, he reported to work, 
found enough people to make a complete crew, and started fighting fire. This sense of 
duty was a driving force for many who found themselves in situations of command 
despite their inexperience. 
5.  Mental Simulation 
Mental simulations are an integral part of Klein’s RPD decision-making model, 
where decision makers draw on past experiences in order to determine whether a 
proposed tactic could be successful if applied.  However, even without experience as a 
reference, there were eighteen examples of mental simulations. Officer Dormann recalled 
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scanning a room he had never been in before for possible hiding places of weapons.  
When the person of interest reached for a drawer, he already knew what he would do 
because he had mentally simulated it only moments before. Another police officer noted 
that he imagines possible shooting incidents and predecides tactics when he waits at red 
lights in his patrol vehicle. When he was asked to develop a plan for fighting a fire in his 
own neighborhood, one fire captain got to implement a plan that he had simulated in his 
mind years before.  While these simulations are common practice in public safety 
disciplines, the fact that they are being applied in novel circumstances is significant. The 
key difference between this finding and Klein’s RPD is that it appears these commanders 
are able to create a mental model and evaluate potential outcomes even without direct 
past experience to use as a comparison to evaluate success. 
6.  Collective Problem Solving 
Collective problem solving was noted in most of the successful examples of 
decision making.  Both the police and fire disciplines have a system of progressive higher 
ranking officers that respond to any incident.  The dispatch of these ranking officers is 
meant to be resources for the incident commanders, with standard operating procedures 
commonly stating that the most experienced and most appropriate person on scene should 
be the incident commander, not the person with the highest rank (FEMA, 2010).  Both 
police and fire gave examples of staff being consulted on decisions during these complex 
and novel incidents.  In the example from the 2003 Cedar Fire, fire chiefs met informally 
by the road to discuss the fire behavior and offer ideas for possible tactics. For Officer 
Lehan-Nichols, she enlisted the help of other officers, including an officer that spoke 
Spanish, to help her understand what was going on and make the right decision. The 
aggregation of multiple perspectives and ideas was seen as a benefit to the decision-
making process.  Some incident commanders consulted their superiors, others consulted 
their staff, and some sought outside subject-matter experts. 
7.  Perspective 
A common trait in novel situations is a narrowed perspective of the situation as a 
whole.  Officer Dormann gave an example of a time when he was serving a warrant and 
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was locked inside the house by family members and had to call for backup.  In this 
example, their focus had been on controlling the person of interest in the house, and they 
had not realized the risks of the other family members in the residence. 
Chief Carle cited the example of a tanker fire.  The initial staff on scene had been 
concerned with putting out the fire, which was not at risk of spreading. In the meantime, 
fuel was leaking into a watershed nearby.  The firefighters had only concentrated on the 
fire and had failed to look at the larger implications of the incident, including 
environmental damage. In general, a higher likelihood of achieving incident objectives 
was noted when a wider, rather than narrower, perspective was utilized when observing 
the incident environment. 
8.  Information 
Gathering information regarding the multiple factors impacting an incident is also 
important to the decision making. In almost every interview, the research subject 
mentioned a lack of information initially.  Where the research subjects varied was what 
they did to improve their situational awareness.  Both Chief Fennessy and Chief Gardner 
gave examples of incomplete or incorrect data, including inaccurate incident locations 
and wrong unit numbers.  Both actively questioned the validity of the data given and 
pushed staff to reconfirm information that did not seem correct. Chief Fennessy discussed 
sending multiple spotters to the area, and even requesting unified command with another 
agency in order to ensure he was getting as much information about the incident as was 
possible.  In describing a radio call regarding a situation where a fire crew was trapped by 
fire and needed assistance, Chief Gardner recalls: 
She gave the wrong engine number because she was a cover person. She 
was normally on another engine.  So the delay of what was probably two 
minutes, but it seems like it was two hours, going to roll call, calling the 
fire station of the fire engine she screamed that was not assigned to the 
fire, trying to figure out if it was a hoax.  Was somebody really sick? We 
couldn’t figure it out.  We brought everything else to a screaming halt.  
Seven or eight people were trying to get the picture, find out the facts, and 
determine what our next step was.  
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In both cases, the gathering of information was a key part of the process, often 
leading to a change in tactics as new information was learned. 
9.  Trust 
Trust was noted as a factor twelve different times during the interview process.  
Trust included trust in themselves and their team, trust in the plan, trust that tactics 
training would be remembered when the time came.  Trust is a valuable tool in 
overcoming the doubt that can lead to uncertainty and inaction.  Trust cannot be taught or 
trained, but it is something that can be stressed in the development of a novice personnel.  
Both fire and police commanders mentioned the value of training in stressful situations in 
order to build this trust in advance.  It was noted that experience did not have to be 
directly applicable to the incident in order to be valuable.  Just knowing how you will 
react and trusting your instincts under stress was considered enough. 
10.  Comfort in the Unknown 
An interesting finding in analyzing the interviews was that often, successful 
commanders found comfort in operating in unknown situations.  Chief Fennessy notes: 
It depends on the individual. Some people thrive on the chaos. It is almost 
a calming thing, knowing that there are not necessarily any rules, whatever 
they decide to do. 
When considering a tactic never tried before but suggested by colleagues in 
another discipline, Lt Leonard stated, “I was looking for something to do that would be 
right. I thought, well, why not?”  Instead of unknowns inhibiting action, these decision 
makers viewed their decisions as opportunities to test, and were comfortable with the 
possibility of a negative outcome.  To them, the unknown complex circumstances 
lessened the consequences of failure and allowed them more of an opportunity to 
experiment, because any action was better than none. 
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D.  REDUCTION OF CODES TO RELEVANT CONCEPTS 
Two concepts emerged from the coding process of the interviews when compared 
back to the original research question: What is the process for making decisions in 
complex novel situations? 
1.  Naturalistic Decision Making 
Based on their own descriptions of their processes, the commanders interviewed 
did indeed seem to be using a form of naturalistic decision-making process.  At no time 
during the interview process did the research subjects discuss evaluating multiple options 
simultaneously to determine the optimal solution.  Instead, testing and probing through 
the implementation of possible satisfactory tactics singularly was preferred. In using 
naturalistic decision making to make decisions associated with an incident, there were 
also many similarities to the processes described by Klein’s RPD, even though Klein 
states that experience is a critical component of the RPD concept.    Figure 4 shows three 
of the most common themes found and their relationship to RPD. 
When discussing possible tactics to remove a person from a dangerous window-
ledge, Lt Leonard used a modified form of the RPD model to evaluate the possible 
solutions offered by people around him.  He rapidly examined each tactic singularly by 
mentally simulating potential outcomes based on what he knew about the situation and 
the proposed tactics to identify potential outcomes.  Those outcomes were then compared 
to the goal he was trying to accomplish, which was to get the person out of the window 
sill safely. 
 
Figure 4.   Distillation of Codes to RPD 
Similarly, a fire captain was able to singularly evaluate tactics and make decisions 
using the experience of elders in the fire community, including his own father.  
Evaluating known geography of the area, and the experiences learned from conversations 
with people who had been involved in past fires in the area, he was able to develop a 
mental simulation of how the fire might behave and then test each possible solution 
through that filter as they were considered, until a satisfactory one was found. Based on 
examples in this study, it is possible that a modified version of Klein’s decision-making 
process could address the need for experience in order to apply the concepts of RPD if an 






2.  Complexity Theory 
The other realization during the research process was that many of the concepts 
identified during the coding process describe aspects of complexity theory (Figure 5).   
 
Figure 5.   Distillation of Codes to Complexity Theory 
Complexity theory looks at a system as a whole and is concerned with the agents 
involved, their ability to interact with each other, and the consequences of those 
interactions.  Systems get progressively more complex as the number of agents increase 
or the number of interactions between the agents becomes more frequent.  Figure 6 shows 
a cynefin framework, which is a descriptive model, dividing decision making into four 
domains: known, knowable, complex, and chaotic (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). Each 
domain differs in knowledge about the relationship between cause and effect. In the 
complex quadrant of the cynefin framework, emerging patterns can be perceived but not 
predicted.  This differs from chaos, where patterns can no longer even be perceived 
(Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). 
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Figure 6.   Cynefin Framework 
The themes identified through the coding process also support the concepts of 
complexity theory.  Table 2 lists the various codes discovered from the interview process 
that relate to concepts of complexity theory.  This list represents 74% of the total number 
of codes generated. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
While these two concepts, RPD and Complexity Theory, were derived at different 
times, from different schools of thought, relating the two concepts into a single model 
may offer new insight into the decision-making process in complex novel situations.  
Both theories focus on the value of information, especially the recognition of patterns.  
RPD’s pattern recognition is based on personal experience, and the ability to draw 
parallels from past events for application to current events. Complexity theory takes the 
stance that due to the vast numbers of ways agents in a system can interact, no two 
situations are ever the same in a complex environment, and therefore, past experience 
may not matter as much as the ability to recognize and subsequently manipulate how 





Control of the Situation 41 
Open to the Environment 21 
Active Role in the Process 20 




Comfort in Unknown Situations 9 




Action Oriented 5 
Indirect Experience 5 
Reduce to Complicated 3 
Reassessment 2 




Total Count of Occurrences              197 out of 266  
Table 2.   Interview Codes Associated with Complexity Theory 
To discover how decisions are made in complex and novel environments, it is 
important to understand how and if these two concepts intersect, as shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.   Combining RPD and Complexity Theory 
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In order to understand the relationship between the two concepts, both topics were 
selected for further research and consideration in development of a descriptive model of 
decision making in complex novel environments. The next chapter will outline the results 
of this additional study of existing knowledge on the two topics, and explore how the two 
could be combined into a process model. 
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V.  THE MASHUP: RPD + COMPLEXITY = EX2DM 
A.  RECOGNITION-PRIMED DECISION MAKING (RPD) 
Gary Klein’s RPD work focuses on decision making in stressful and time-
constrained environments.  A significant finding from Klein was the realization that 
decision makers working in these conditions do not compare alternatives when making a 
decision, a process normally associated with rational analytical decision making. Figure 8 
represents the rational analytical decision-making process where many options are 
developed and then evaluated simultaneously, with the best option selected. 
 
Figure 8.   Rational Analytical Decision Making Process  
With RPD, only one possible solution is identified for a given problem. The 
potential solution is evaluated using mental simulations based on past experience to 
determine if it will work.  If it will not work, then that solution is discarded and the 
decision maker tries to identify another solution to evaluate.  This process repeats until a 
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solution is found that will work. Figure 9 depicts the Klein’s RPD process model 
detailing the steps of decision making under these conditions. 
 
Figure 9.   Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model (After Klein, Orasanu, 
Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1995, p. 108)  
The critical component of RPD is sensemaking.  In this model, successful 
decision makers, operating under stress and limited time, “recognize important features 
of a problem and directly retrieve appropriate actions or solution techniques” (Klein, 
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 into account differences” (Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 
1995, p
) is 




Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1995, p. 63). The term recognition is used 
synonymously with pattern matching and is based on a personal mental library of past 
recollections of the decision maker. “New problems may be solved by recognizing their 
similarity to older, better understood problems and by appropriately transforming the old 
solution to take
. 63).    
An example would be a fire commander using past personal experience fighting 
wildland fires to predict how fast a current fire will spread. According to Klein, 
experience can aid in identifying causal factors that help the decision maker determine, 
based on past history, what is happening and, what will happen (Klein, Orasanu, 
Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1995).  It is from these expectancies that goals can be 
determined. In the wildland fire example, the goal would then be to stop the fire before it 
spreads to the structures 100 yards away. Actions are evaluated through a serial approach 
to determine if they meet the stated goals (e.g., should a hand crew be used to cut a line?).  
Each potential action is mentally simulated to see if the action performed in the context 
of the current environment will meet the goals identified (will they have time to cut a line 
before the fire spreads to that location?).  If the decision maker believes, after simulation, 
that the action will meet the goal, then it is implemented (even if more effective actions 
may be possible).  If the action will not meet the goal, then it is either modified or 
rejected.  If rejected, another action (e.g., water drop from aerial assets in the area
COMPLEXITY THEORY 
Complexity theory has existed for over 100 years (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003).  
Central to complexity theory is the concept that complex systems cannot be understood 
simply by breaking down the system to its subcomponents.  Instead, a more open and 
inclusive view of a system is necessary to constantly scan for small acts, which have the 
al to incite larger disruptions in the system (Ramo, 2009).  
Complexity theory accepts the basic unpredictability in one’s environment.  
Instead of noting what is similar or familiar, complexity theory emphasizes focusing on 
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is is done by intervening to stabilize desirable patterns and destabilize 
undesir
able 3 gives examples of possible agents, 
artifacts, and interactions for a wildland fire. 
what is different or out of place (Ramo, 2009). In this paradigm, success is measured in 
one’s ability to keep the enemy (human or environmental, depending on the situation) 
from adapting.  Th
able ones. 
At the core of complexity theory are agents, artifacts, and interactions.  Agents are 
people or things in a system that interact with the system environment, including other 
agents.  Agents form populations, or groups of agents (often called a swarm), following 
simple rules and acting in similar behavior patterns.  Artifacts are things in the system 
that impact agents and how they interface with their environment. Interactions can occur 
between agents or between populations.  T
Agents Artifacts Interactions 
The fire Topography re Putting water on fi
Firefighters Fuels Cutting fire lines 
Civilians in the area Weather Setting back fires 
Command staff and 
elected officials 
Resources (fire engines,
dozers, aerial support) 
 Evacuations 





Housing developments Refusal to evacuate 
health, eme
managemen
The m s edia Policies and procedures Civilian rescue
Table 3.   Potential Components of a Wildland Fire System 
n multiple agents that 
increas
A system is then one or more populations of agents, the strategies of those agents, 
relevant artifacts, and the environment where the agents exist (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000). 
A system is complex when there are strong interactions betwee
e the number of possible future interactions at a later time. 
Complex systems are often found to self organize.  Order and patterns develop in 
a system via the repetition of interactions through and between populations.  How much 
agents are allowed to interact can have large-scale impacts on the system as a whole. The 
allowance of multiple interactions can lead to avalanches, where a small change is 
propagated via a cascading chain reaction to cause an impact on the system up to the 




 finding a 
proper 
t missing more subtle cues. Just a slight change in the wind can impact a wildland 
fire.  
structure at the edge of a neighborhood can then lead to a whole neighborhood burning as 
the fire moves from house to house in an unpredictable pattern. Conversely, the 
restriction of interactions can lead to self-restoring patterns, where a large change is 
insulated to only a certain population and the system is able to recover.  By not a
dland fire to reach the first structure, a whole neighborhood can be saved. 
 In this construct, strategy is “the way an agent responds to its surroundings and 
pursues its goals” (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000, p. 4) through the manipulation of agent 
interactions with other agents and the system environment. Strategies can occur at the 
agent or population level. Variety is created in a system through exploration and 
exploitation.  Exploration is the search for new strategies and applies more to novel 
circumstances. Exploitation parallels Klein’s RPD model of using past experience 
modified to match a current context.  System resilience is then achieved by
balance between exploitation and exploration when making decisions.   
In the domain of the complex, there are so many factors inter-relating, the cause 
and effect of these interactions is difficult to discern before or during the event. In fact, 
the inability to predict behavior during an incident is a key indicator that one is operating 
within the realm of the complex. Each interaction can change the course of future 
interactions.  Once a wildland fire reaches the first structure, evacuations may become a 
higher priority than cutting a fire break. What we think will work now may not be viable 
a short time in the future. For this reason, decision makers must be flexible and not 
limited by the current plan. They must be constantly watching for signals of potential 
change, willing to update their understanding or even empathize with their environment 
(Ramo, 2009).   As such, field commanders operating in this situation will need to be 






ey sh hen, 2000): 
d uniformity? 
3. ts or strategies should be copied and which should be 
about manipulation of the system, even if they do not understand 
all of th
social change, have occurred without the benefit of such explicit 
knowledge, let alone theoretical understanding. (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000, 
al of protecting structures) and see how the interactions impact the 
system
Th ould also be asking the following questions (Axelrod & Co
1. What is the right balance between variety an
2. What should interact with what and when? 
Which agen
destroyed? 
Constantly evaluating the situations in terms of these questions allows the 
decision maker to think 
e components.  
Not having to understand the situation can be an important advantage. 
Indeed, most of the accomplishments of biological evolution, and much 
human 
p. 88) 
In the complex, what, how and when are far more important than why, because 
why can only be determined in hindsight.  Accepting this basic premise of complexity 
frees the decision maker to focus only on the components of the system they are actually 
able to control: what are the agents in the system, how can they impact each other, and 
when should they interact in order to achieve a stabilizing effect for the incident as a 
whole? The initial over arching goal when attempting to manage a complex incident is 
first and foremost to shift the incident out of the complex realm and back to either the 
known or knowable, as per the cynefin framework.  Operationally, this means stabilizing 
the incident to the point that standard operating procedures now apply consistently. This 
is done by manipulating the agents and interactions in the system, trying different 
strategies to shift the system back towards order.  Strategies that result in increased order 
are exploited.  In a wildland fire, if water drops are working, then do more water drops. 
Strategies that lead to chaos are terminated, and the decision maker then uses exploration 
to try something new (stop doing water drops and consider if a backfire would help 
accomplish your go
 as a whole. 
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onally, the very act of talking through 
the pro
d to overall incident 
destabilization.  Constantly scanning the environment for subtle cues can minimize the 
n evaluation of a situation can actually alter the situation itself. However, Klein’s RPD 
 
There is also a benefit to gaining multiple perspectives, including those who have 
less experience, because the “methods, tools, techniques of the known and knowable 
domains do not work [in the complex].  Narrative techniques are especially powerful in 
this space” (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, p. 470). Chief Downey recalls a rescuer from his 
team coming to him and making a case for why they should continue a search.  “It was 
clearly communicated and quite honestly, I wasn’t thinking about it, but I had shortened 
their rotation times amongst teams just because I knew the guys were getting tired and I 
think that translated to the guys that I was looking at rotating those guys out.“ Through 
communications between team members, the junior member of the team was able to 
articulate a concern of the whole team that their leader had not realized. For this reason, 
teaming experienced practitioners with novices can prove valuable, since a novice may 
be able to see patterns and offer a new way of attacking the problem without the burden 
of following how it has always been done. Additi
blem between a novice and an expert can identify strengths and weaknesses of a 
plan that a single perspective would not provide.   
In a complex system, individual parts combine in a way that does not equal the 
sum of these parts.  For that reason, the incident commander must evaluate success and 
the impact of decisions in the context of the individual population or area it is exercised, 
as well as from the perspective of overall system stabilization.  Both perspectives have 
meaning in a complex system and neither should be ignored.  A decision impacting one 
area has the potential to cause a chain reaction of events that can lea
risk of this occurring. Still the decision maker must remain vigilant. 
C.  EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION DECISION MAKING (EX2DM) 
Many of the concepts of Klein’s RPD model have a foundation in complexity 
theory, including leverage and choke points, looking for differences, and the notion that 
a
addresses only one type of strategy: exploitation. Figure 10 shows the result of modifying 
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el, into a new process model, Exploitation and Exploration Decision 
Making
ar, then the path of exploration, the search for new strategies, should be 
considered. 
Klein’s RPD process model to incorporate the both exploitation and exploration: the 
known and the nov
 (Ex2DM). 
Ex2DM is an expansion of the original concept of RPD presented by Klein.  
Ex2DM accepts the premises of RPD, but presents the RPD model as one of two possible 
paths.  The pivotal question in RPD, “Is the situation familiar?” excludes novel situations 
because it is reliant on the decision maker having experienced similar incidents in the 
past.  In Ex2DM, this question is used to differentiate the types of strategies the incident 
commander may want to consider: exploitation or exploration.  For those situations 
where the decision maker has past experiences that could be applied to this new situation, 
the exploitation path is recommended, replicating Klein’s RPD.  However, if the situation 
is not famili
 
Figure 10.   Exploration and Exploitation Decision Making (Ex2DM) 
Under the exploration path, the incident commander is encouraged to scan the 
environment from a wider perspective in order to define the system. Understanding the 
system includes knowing the agents who are involved, if they are assembled into 
populations, whether there are aspects of the system that will impact potential 
interactions, and what interactions are already occurring.  Table 4 provides an example of 
the types of agents, artifacts, and interactions the incident commander might be scanning 




Agents Artifacts Interactions 
Suspect Buildings  Police interviews with 
suspect 
Known associates Neighborhood Police and known associates 
Civilians in the area Known Information about 
the situation, people involved
Civilian interactions with the 
suspect 
Police Resources of the suspect Civilian interactions with 
known associates 
Other public safety 
(example: fire if there is 
an injury) 
Resources of the police 
(additional police, aerial 
support, special teams) 
Civilian interactions with the 
media 
The media Policies and procedure Media at the scene 
Table 4.   Potential Components of a Suspect Interview 
Armed with this perspective, the decision maker can then use three questions in 
order to determine where best to concentrate efforts:   
1. What is the right balance between variety and uniformity? 
2. What should interact with what and when? 
3. Which agents or strategies should be copied and which should be 
destroyed? 
These questions lead the strategist to consider the various components already at 
play and determine which should be encouraged and which should be prevented.  The 
answers to these question lead to potential actions to influence the system.  In a law 
enforcement example, it may be the decision to take a person of interest wanted for 
questioning to an area away from the public and known associates of the person, in order 
to ensure greater control of the situation by creating barriers to limit interactions. 
In a complex situation, where outcomes are difficult to predict, one cannot know 
in advance exactly how a particular strategy will affect all aspects of the system.  
Whether using exploitation or exploration, the strategist uses mental simulations to 
identify potential issues with implementing the plan. The criteria for evaluating possible 
actions changes slightly from the RPD model, where the question was “Will it work?” In 
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a complex environment, one cannot know definitively if any strategy will work; there are 
simply too many potential interactions.  For Ex2DM the criteria is, “Could it increase 
overall system stabilization?” For law enforcement, the simple act of wanting to question 
a person of interest could result in an arrest or turn into a mob scene. The decision maker 
must determine if the potential gain is greater than the possible risks. 
Once a strategy is selected and implemented, the process does not end.  Instead, it 
loops back to experiencing the situation.  In complexity, a single strategy is unlikely to 
solve all problems. It might, there is always that potential, but if that happened, the 
system probably did not have as many possible outcomes as originally considered.  In the 
complex quadrant, where the potential for several combinations of actions will decide 
future outcomes, it is more likely that successful stabilization will require many decisions 
with multiple assessments of progress throughout the incident. 
D. A CASE STUDY: THE FIRE HOSE AS A NON-LETHAL WEAPON 
When responding to a call for service at a second-story apartment building, Lt 
Leonard found a male who was reportedly high on drugs (INFORMATION13) and was 
going crazy in the house.  Upon arrival, Lt Leonard found the male standing in broken 
glass in the sill of an upstairs bay window.  Lt Leonard was a sergeant at the time, and his 
lieutenant was at the scene. The lieutenant was pressuring him to use his baton to pull the 
person out of the sill (EXPLOITATION, OPTION DEEMED NOT VIABLE).  Other 
options presented by the lieutenant were to use a Tazer on the individual 
(EXPLOITATION, OPTION DEEMED NOT VIABLE).  As each option was presented, 
Lt Leonard reported that he thought through how the tactic would be applied (MENTAL 
SIMULATION) and he was concerned that there was a strong likelihood that the man 
would fall backwards out of the second story window, which would certainly injure him 
and could kill him (GOAL – GET THE MAN OUT OF THE WINDOW WITHOUT 
INJURING HIM). When a possible tactic was discounted, another option was considered, 
showing a singular evaluation when searching for an appropriate action (RPD). After 
 
13 In this section, concepts discussed previously associated with the Ex2DM model are noted in all 
caps and parenthesis. For example: (MENTAL SIMULATION). 
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discounting a few different options, and not seeing an obvious solution, Lt Leonard 
excused himself from the situation, reportedly to go outside to think for a moment away 
from the pressure of the scene (CONTROL OF AROUSAL). He wanted to find a place 
where he could think for a minute, and have a conversation with God.   
“Part of that is removing yourself a little bit from the situation and giving yourself 
time to actually have things kind of come to you.” While walking down the stairs, Lt 
Leonard passed two EMTs who had been staged by the fire department.  The two EMTs 
were having a private conversation, and Lt Leonard overheard (OPEN TO THE 
ENVIRONMENT) the following: “too bad they can’t just shoot him with the fire hose.” 
Lt Leonard did a mental simulation and determined that the solution might work 
(EXPLORATION, OPTION DEEMED VIABLE) and went to talk to the fire captain also 
staged at the scene (COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING).  The two worked out a plan 
where the man was distracted by the police officers until a signal was given over the 
radio. At that time, the firefighters pressurized their hose, spraying the man with water 
from the outside, pushing him inside the apartment.  The plan included several 
contingencies, since Lt Leonard had never used a fire hose as a non-lethal use of force 
before, (COMFORT IN THE UNKNOWN) and therefore had difficulty predicting the 
outcome (COMPLEXITY).  The plan worked, and they were able to use the force of the 
water to push the man inside the apartment and get handcuffs on the man before he even 
realized what was happening.  No one was hurt, and the apartment suffered only minimal 
damage, mostly the clearing of the popcorn from the ceilings. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
A decision-making process that incorporates complexity theory prepares the 
commander to be cognizant of a situation as a complex interconnected system, with the 
hope that desirable patterns will appear and can be encouraged (Kurtz & Snowden, 
2003).  For incident commanders, this involves studying the environment from a wider, 
more encompassing perspective: watching for new changes, and determining if these 
changes benefit overall system stabilization. This is fundamentally different than taking a 
large complex incident, dividing it geographically or by responding discipline, breaking 
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the problem down to pieces, and managing each piece individually.  This is not easy for 
most. People want to minimize and compartmentalize a problem to try and make it easier 
to comprehend. However, simplifying a problem runs the risk of missing relationships 
between different aspects of the system that may lead to unexpected outcomes. 
Monitoring an incident holistically, and making decisions based on exploration and 
exploitation of multiple tactics can mitigate unexpected chain reactions that may start 
small but can quickly destabilize an incident. 
Ex2DM is supported by the fact that many components of complexity theory have 
already been suggested by experts in the decision-making field. Klein developed the 
concept of leverage points, defined as a small difference that makes a large impact to 
create a new course of action.  He asserts that the key is to notice something that is 
causing difficulty before there are signs of trouble, and mitigate the impact before things 
get out of control (Klein, 1998).  This is a key component of complexity theory illustrated 
by Bak’s avalanche experiment (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000).  Gladwell also provides an 
example of military commanders who become so focused on the mechanics and the 
process of information gathering and assessing, that they never look at the problem 
holistically (Gladwell, 2005).  Addressing the situation as a single complex system, not 
just a sum of its parts, is a core component of both complexity theory and naturalistic 
decision-making models such as RPD. 
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VI. EVALUATION OF THE MODEL 
A.  EVALUATION OF EX2DM AS A GROUNDED THEORY 
According to Glauser and Strauss, pioneers in Grounded Theory, any theory, 
hypothesis, or new model developed based on the description of actual practice can be 
evaluated to determine if the new concept is valid and therefore applicable on a wider 
scale (Glauser & Strauss, 1967).  Table 5 presents the results of the evaluation of Ex2DM 
against the five criteria for new concepts developed using Grounded Theory. 
Grounded Theory Evaluation Criteria Results for Ex2DM 
Enable prediction and explanation of 
behavior 
Ex2DM was developed to explain the 
behavior of actual decision makers based 
on interviews performed as part of this 
research. 
Be useful in theoretical advancement in the 
subject 
Ex2DM builds upon existing knowledge in 
the area of decision making under stress 
and time constraints, by offering a model 
that no longer excludes situations where 
the decision maker does not have past 
experience. 
Be useful in practical solutions Ex2DM, while developed based on 
complex incident command scenarios for 
public safety, may be applicable to any 
complex situation where a decision must 
be made. 
Provide perspective on behavior In complex novel situations there exists a 
gap in the research pertaining to how 
strategies are developed in absence of past 
personal knowledge of a similar situation.  
Ex2DM addresses how actual incident 
commanders work through the problem. 
Guide and provide style for more research More research could be performed to 
develop and refine the model based on 
additional case studies.  Further research 
could also pursue if application of this 
model would improve future incident 
management in complex novel 
environments. 
Table 5.   Evaluation of Ex2DM as a Grounded Theory 
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B.  EVALUATION OF EX2DM AGAINST THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
In addition to determining whether Ex2DM is a substantive model, it is also 
important to evaluate it against the original research question:  
What is the process for making decisions in complex novel situations? 
Ex2DM details a process used by fire and law professionals.  When the 2007 
wildfires in San Diego County became too complex to comprehend based on the 
information they were receiving from citizens and firefighters in the field, Chief 
Fennessy sent spotters to the scene to identify and classify agents, artifacts, and 
interactions of the fire complex (see Table 2 for examples).  He then used that increased 
situational awareness to evaluate the impact of current actions and determine if changes 
were necessary.  Decisions were made to confront certain portions of the fire while 
allowing other portions to continue unchecked. He was attempting to control when (not 
if) fire would hit neighborhoods that needed to be evacuated.  When strategies worked, 
the chief exploited them.  When they were not successful, he explored new ideas. 
In a law example, a better understanding of the incident as a complex system 
could have aided a police officer confronted with a mob after trying to make an arrest on 
the beach during a crowded holiday weekend.  Classification of agents (bystanders, other 
police in the area), artifacts (the hot summer weather, alcohol consumed, previous police 
interaction with the beach goers) and interactions (bystanders forming a mob and 
attacking the police officers) might have provided a better understanding of the 
environment, which would have highlighted the need to explore different tactics for 
controlling the scene. 
Ex2DM is a theoretical descriptive model.  As such, it offers insight into how 
some have been able to overcome the harsh conditions of managing a complex incident.  
Any public safety professional can expect to encounter a complex incident during the 
course of their careers.  This model provides a framework for future incident 




common in these types of incidents. Encouraging a wider perspective and looking for 
ways to explore interactions enables the decision maker to proactively navigate the 
complexity and stabilize the incident. 
C.  PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF EX2DM IN PUBLIC SAFETY 
1.  Training 
The integration of Ex2DM into the common practices of incident commanders 
would require command staff to be trained on the general concepts of naturalistic 
decision making and recognizing complexity, as well as Ex2DM model specifically.  This 
could be accomplished through in-service training sessions or formal classes.  
Commanders would be taught the characteristics of complex systems and how to 
define the system boundaries, agents, artifacts, and interactions.  Incident mitigation 
would be framed in terms of system stabilization through the exploitation of previously 
known strategies and the freedom to explore new tactics through the decision framework.  
Decision makers would be encouraged to constantly scan the environment for changes 
and look for stabilizing and destabilizing patterns. Once patterns are identified, actions 
could then be adjusted to manipulate interactions, moving the system toward more 
familiar situations where standardized procedures are more effective. The goal of this 
training would be to make incident commanders familiar with the concepts—in a sense, 
giving them a tool to work through complex novel situations. 
2.  Resource Allocation 
Throughout the interviews, collective decision making was noted. Multiple 
perspectives, creative ideas, and innovative approaches are the key to positively 
impacting a complex system (Snowden & Boone, 2007). Ex2DM provides a decision 
model, which is applicable whether the strategist is alone or working in a group. 
However, Ex2DM benefits from as much inclusion as possible.  Multiple people, and 
more importantly, people with diverse past experiences, improve the collective 
sensemaking by offering more potential strategies to exploit and a wider variety of 
creative ideas to explore. 
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Relying on expert opinions based on historically stable patterns of 
meaning will insufficiently prepare us to recognize and act upon 
unexpected patterns. (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, p. 469) 
Assigning resources with varied backgrounds and levels of experience to roles in 
the command post can enable this cross-pollination of ideas. An incident command post 
for a large-scale incident is often a very busy place, and the intention is not to add more 
people to the mix, just to widen perspective.  There are often many roles in a typical 
incident management team. Purposefully including personnel with a mix of backgrounds 
and expertise would accomplish the goal of having diverse perspectives to help monitor 
the incident and contribute new ideas. 
3.  Culture Change 
Finally, for an organization to embrace Ex2DM some degree of culture change 
will be necessary.  In a complex situation, the right answers are not obvious.  Instead, 
tactics must be evaluated and then tested, with the potential outcomes witnessed rather 
than predicted.  This sort of environment does not mesh well with classic command and 
control styles of leadership.  Being comfortable with trying new ideas, accepting that not 
all strategies will be successful, and encouraging creativity requires a more open and 
inclusive form of management.   
Incident commanders fall back to what they know and are comfortable with in 
stressful conditions.  If an organization does not allow creativity and collaboration in its 
normal operations, its commanders will not be comfortable incorporating new ideas 
during complex incidents.  An organizational culture that values new ideas and respects 
the collective knowledge of the more experienced members will enable decision makers 




D.  LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE STUDY 
The research conducted in this thesis does have its limitations.  First and foremost 
is the small sample size of research subjects interviewed. With the opportunity to 
interview additional incident commanders, it is possible that other themes would have 
been more prevalent than the ones exposed in this study. Interviewing a greater number 
of decision makers across a diverse geographical area is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but would be an excellent opportunity to expand the body of knowledge regarding the 
practical application of decision making under stress. As noted by both Klein and Weick, 
public safety professionals are excellent research subjects in this area due to their 
stressful working conditions and variety of situations they encounter (Klein, Orasanu, 
Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1995; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).   
Because Ground Theory methodology was used to generate the Ex2DM model, it 
might be beneficial if future work used deductive, rather than inductive, methods. Testing 
the Ex2DM model deductively would be a way to confirm or refute the findings presented 
here.  A possible experiment could be to train novice strategists in the concepts of 
Ex2DM and then judge their performance in simulated incidents to determine if advanced 
knowledge of the model and its supporting concepts could improve the quality of 
decisions made when applied to a novel scenario.  Also interesting would be an 
experiment to determine if using Ex2DM would reduce any of the physical responses 
associated with stress and overload for incident commanders. 
Finally, this thesis studied public safety professionals who respond to critical 
incidents.  However, complexity exists outside of natural disasters, terrorist events, and 
other catastrophes.  Ex2DM may be applicable to any environment where a person is 
attempting to manipulate a complex system.  Making this leap, however, would require 
further research outside the scope of this project. 
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E.  CONCLUSION 
The field of homeland security centers on the prevention, preparedness, response, 
and recovery from incidents occurring on our nation’s soil, whether natural or man-made.  
Yet, it is difficult to prepare for, or prevent, incidents that have not yet been envisioned. 
In these cases, how we respond becomes critical.  Incident commanders, who incorporate 
concepts of complexity theory into their orientation process through the use of Ex2DM, 
have the tools they need to work through any complex problem, even if it is completely 
new and beyond the bounds of anything experienced in the past.  
By viewing incidents as complex systems, decision makers become aware of 
emergent order, even if they are unable to control it. Complexity theory offers a new way 
of addressing problems, a perspective where even in a lack of order, patterns from 
interactions between agents can be perceived and new methods of thinking can emerge 
(Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). This wider perspective, and comfort in the knowledge that not 
everything is controllable, offers the decision maker an opportunity to be creative and 
discover new ways to change the course of an incident. 
Decision making is an important part of incident response, but we cannot forget 
that our decisions must lead to action. Retired Battalion Chief Tom Gardner notes, “You 
can’t talk it out.  Eventually, you have to go out there and put the fire out.”  Whether it is 
a fire, a search and rescue mission after a major catastrophe, or an active shooter, these 
incident commanders are tasked with finding a way to sort through the complexity to get 
the incident stabilized with as little loss of life and property as possible.  Eventually, 
decisions must be implemented.  
Following the Ex2DM model encourages incident commanders to consider 
options that in the past would not have been recognized as even a possibility, to try new 
ideas to see if they will work, knowing some may not.  Uncertainty can paralyze a 
strategist. Ex2DM helps to overcome this uncertainty by imparting the understanding that 
in the complex, prediction and absolutes do not apply.  Every decision has a risk, but 
through an iterative process of trial and error, complexity can be reined in. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW CODES 
OPEN CODE AXIAL CODE 
Ability to act under pressure just as 
important as training and experience ACTION ORIENTED 
Compelled to act ACTION ORIENTED 
Job assignment ACTION ORIENTED 
Looking for something to do ACTION ORIENTED 
Trained to get past uncertainty ACTION ORIENTED 
Action over pondering ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Actively searching for solution ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Any plan better than no plan ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Challenge authority ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Chose action over uncertainty ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Didn't wait for information to come in, 
actively gathering ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Don't let lack of resources hold you back ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Fight for right decision ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Getting people to offer input ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Had to make a case ACTIVOLE IN PROCESS 
Hesitant to question authority ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Looking for problems ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Looking for problems and fixing before 
they become issues ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Make your own luck ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Managing personalities ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Rally support ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Sell decision to others ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Sell the idea that this was not the usual 
incident ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Start working plan B ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Stepped into leadership role ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 
Constantly re-evaluating ASSESSMENT 
Band aid fix, one step at a time BOUNDARIES 
Eliminate variables BOUNDARIES 
Experience teaches you boundaries and 
when to push them BOUNDARIES 
Small steps (1) scan (2) plan (3) resources BOUNDARIES 





OPEN CODE AXIAL CODE 
Stop emergent trends BOUNDARIES 
Stop it where it is right BOUNDARIES 
Use natural barriers to advantage BOUNDARIES 
Aware, overheard conversation COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Bounce ideas off of SMEs COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Collective experience COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Comfortable collaborating because of 
informal sharing COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Deference to seniority, seen as a learning 
experience COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Group decision COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Group decision, all or none COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Group decision, overruled rank COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Inclusion of other parties in the process COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Informal network COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Lack of seasoned mentors COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Mentoring COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Multi-person brainstorming COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
No way to act alone, had to rely on help 
due to model COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Proximity to experience, informal mentors COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Team decision COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
Choice is a good thing, not a bad thing COMFORT IN UNKNOWN SITUATION 
Comfort in chaos COMFORT IN UNKNOWN SITUATION 
Confidence in knowing that the Calvary is 
coming, focus on initial COMFORT IN UNKNOWN SITUATION 
Experience = confidence COMFORT IN UNKNOWN SITUATION 
Novelty is opportunity for creativity, no 
rules COMFORT IN UNKNOWN SITUATION 
Okay with going outside the boundaries of 
experience COMFORT IN UNKNOWN SITUATION 
Opportunity to change, change isn't bad COMFORT IN UNKNOWN SITUATION 
Personality types, how they act in non-
emergencies COMFORT IN UNKNOWN SITUATION 
Worry about criticism COMFORT IN UNKNOWN SITUATION 
Connectedness CONNECTED WITH ENVIRONMENT 
Walked away from the pressure CONTROL AROUSAL 
Avoid panic CONTROL AROUSAL 
Control arousal CONTROL AROUSAL 





OPEN CODE AXIAL CODE 
Didn't control arousal CONTROL AROUSAL 
Disassociate yourself from the scene CONTROL AROUSAL 
External pressure to perform CONTROL AROUSAL 
Get past denial and start working the 
problem CONTROL AROUSAL 
Just kept going CONTROL AROUSAL 
Mitigate arousal CONTROL AROUSAL 
Self realization of overload CONTROL AROUSAL 
Stay disconnected, unemotional CONTROL AROUSAL 
Control arousal CONTROL AROUSAL 
Controlling arousal CONTROL AROUSAL 
Fight or flight CONTROL AROUSAL 
Inexperienced too aggressive CONTROL AROUSAL 
Isolated distractions and interactions CONTROL AROUSAL 
Over thinking personalizing CONTROL AROUSAL 
Things get missed when over aroused CONTROL AROUSAL 
Training—high confidence in performance 
of tactics CONTROL AROUSAL 
Uncomfortable in leadership role due to 
junior status CONTROL AROUSAL 
Controlled arousal by limiting information 
dispersal over radio CONTROL AROUSAL 
Controlled arousal, stepped away CONTROL AROUSAL 
God, source of comfort CONTROL AROUSAL 
Internal conversation CONTROL AROUSAL 
Over aroused, take off of the incident, 
mundane task to get them mindful CONTROL AROUSAL 
Controlling the environment CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Get away from what is holding you back CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Accept independent variables, serenity 
prayer CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Allow chain reaction CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Be more intimidating than adversary— 
control CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Cannot totally control, only manipulate CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Cascade CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Change control dynamic CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Control conditions CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Control surroundings CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Control the terms 
 
CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
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OPEN CODE AXIAL CODE 
Control time CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Control time and arousal CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Control variables CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Controlling individuals but not the swarm CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Couldn't control speed CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Decide to do nothing until help comes CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Did not mitigate bad circumstances CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Don't let the adversary be more 
comfortable than you CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Establish advance trigger points CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Fire was controlling the timetable, lost 
control of time CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Gather resources, even from 
nonconventional sources CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Loss of control CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Loss of control CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Mitigate what you can control CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
More deliberate later in my career CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Move situation to one where you do have a 
proper tool CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Opportunity presented itself CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Ordinary circumstance goes awry CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Push to more controllable range CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Reacted to the situation CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Slow down time CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Someone else is controlling the situation CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Take advantage of an opportunity CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Take back control CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Trying to control the situation CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Unexpected circumstances, lost coping 
mechanism CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
What you can control, what you can't CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Think long term CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Slow time = not get hurt CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Create the right conditions CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 
Denial DISBELIEF 
Disbelief DISBELIEF 
Non-specific training under stress EXPERIENCE UNDER STRESS 
Past experience in life and death EXPERIENCE UNDER STRESS 
Learned from the storytelling of elders HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE 
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OPEN CODE AXIAL CODE 
Check in with troops - gather intel from 
other sources, multiple perspectives INFORMATION 
Get good info INFORMATION 
Knowing if it is possible to get reliable 
information is a data point to consider INFORMATION 
Lack of communication INFORMATION 
Lack of information INFORMATION 
Language barrier—incomplete information INFORMATION 
Limited information INFORMATION 
Little information INFORMATION 
Manipulate resources to get information INFORMATION 
Missing information INFORMATION 
Multiple sources of intel to minimize 
uncertainty INFORMATION 
Questioning intelligence INFORMATION 
Wrong information INFORMATION 
Wrong information, start reconfirming 
immediately INFORMATION 
Commonalities between small and big 
incidents INDIRECT EXPERIENCE 
Indirect experience INDIRECT EXPERIENCE 
Variety of experience leads to experience INDIRECT EXPERIENCE 
Wide range of experience, life experience INDIRECT EXPERIENCE 




Intuition, things weren't stacking up right INTUITION 
No time to think INTUITION 
Think too much leads to uncertainty INTUITION 
Unconscious action INTUITION 
Very little thought, pondering INTUITION 
Break into sub-steps and solve each 
individually ITEMIZATION 
Ability to see wrong answer and discredit MENTAL SIMULATION 
Captain in command center, use experience 
to visualize MENTAL SIMULATION 
Counterargument considered before 
presented MENTAL SIMULATION 
Draw pictures MENTAL SIMULATION 
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OPEN CODE AXIAL CODE 
Envision worst case and compared with 
available tools MENTAL SIMULATION 
Envisioned MENTAL SIMULATION 
Imagining a worst-case scenario MENTAL SIMULATION 
Imagining and planning ahead MENTAL SIMULATION 
Looking forward in time to answer what 
am I going to need MENTAL SIMULATION 
Mental pre-planning MENTAL SIMULATION 
Metaphor MENTAL SIMULATION 
Predicting forward, planning for worst case MENTAL SIMULATION 
Prediction MENTAL SIMULATION 
Preemption MENTAL SIMULATION 
Thinking about how to maintain order MENTAL SIMULATION 
Various possible combinations MENTAL SIMULATION 
Visualizing tactics MENTAL SIMULATION 
Visualizing worst case scenario MENTAL SIMULATION 
Checking but didn't stop action, watch as it 
unfolds OBSERVATION 
Monitoring OBSERVATION 
Observer not just actor OBSERVATION 
Trust by verify to eliminate uncertainty OBSERVATION 
Watching not doing OBSERVATION 
Look, request, do OBSERVATION 
Studying what is different, what is 
predictable OBSERVATION 
Be prepared for beyond expectations OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Compassion OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Environmental queries OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Heard of but never seen OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Knowledge of the environment just as 
important as direct experience OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Listen OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Listen OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Not monitoring environment, less time to 
react, not controling time OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Open to criticism, add to the intel OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Open, scanning for opportunities OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Proximity to scene OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Recognize not a normal fire, don't have to 
know why or how 
OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
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OPEN CODE AXIAL CODE 
Recognize variables you cannot change OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Respect adversary OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Scanning scene for clues to select tactics OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Size people up OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Subtle cues from environment and 
conditions OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Technology can hinder environmental 
scanning OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Understand the differences, not stuck on 
similarities OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Watching for signs from the environment OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
What the team needed to stay mindful OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
General guidelines, overarching principle OVERARCHING PRINCIPLE 
Choices evaluated for long term impact PERSPECTIVE 
Didn't see the larger picture PERSPECTIVE 
Driven into bad decision by trying to be 
safe, small perspective of safe PERSPECTIVE 
Evaluating long term threat PERSPECTIVE 
Experienced long term solution, 
inexperienced focused on small problem PERSPECTIVE 
Historical perspective PERSPECTIVE 
Larger perspective PERSPECTIVE 
Larger perspective—avoid panic PERSPECTIVE 
Larger perspective more effective PERSPECTIVE 
Learn not to trust or over simplify PERSPECTIVE 
Narrowed perspective, focus only on the 
problem at hand PERSPECTIVE 
Not looking at bigger picture PERSPECTIVE 
Perspective of the larger incident PERSPECTIVE 
Perspective of the team PERSPECTIVE 
Study from afar, larger perspective PERSPECTIVE 
Clear priority, avert death PRIORITIZATION 
Conflicting priorities led to lack of 
perspectives PRIORITIZATION 
Over arching doctrine PRIORITIZATION 
Priorities set by doctrine PRIORITIZATION 
Priority—overarching principle PRIORITIZATION 
Resident safety, getting them prepared PRIORITIZATION 





OPEN CODE AXIAL CODE 
Adjust the plan when variables play out 
different than expected REASSESSMENT 
Checking REASSESSMENT 
Push back to complicated then apply tactics REDUCE TO COMPLICATED 
Reduce the emergency REDUCE TO COMPLICATED 
Try and de-escalate REDUCE TO COMPLICATED 
Relationships RELATIONSHIPS 
Acceptable losses RISK ASSESSMENT 
Calculated risk RISK ASSESSMENT 
Discounted severity RISK ASSESSMENT 
Failure = personal safety RISK ASSESSMENT 
Inexperienced have higher risk profile RISK ASSESSMENT 
Realistic assessment RISK ASSESSMENT 
Risk analysis RISK ASSESSMENT 
Risk assessment RISK ASSESSMENT 
Understood risk of failure RISK ASSESSMENT 
Every day is practice RITUALIZATION 
Get safe, scan environ, get a plan, stay 
mindful (no more than four things) RITUALIZATION 
Goal no longer have to think about it RITUALIZATION 
Pop quizes when not at an incident RITUALIZATION 
Ritualized behavior RITUALIZATION 
Ritualized doctrine, so they don't have to 
think about it, unconscious RITUALIZATION 
Negative evaluation, satisficing SATICIFING 
Satisficing SATICIFING 
Time does not equal experience TIME 
Do something TRAINED TO ACT 
Ask for what you need, only what you need 
(TRUST) TRUST 
Confidence of plan TRUST 
Do the right thing, build internal 
confidence TRUST 
Know your tools in the tool belt TRUST 
Not afraid TRUST 
Not enough motivation to get ahead of it, 
disbelief TRUST 
Second-guessing yourself TRUST 
Trust TRUST 
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OPEN CODE AXIAL CODE 
Trust TRUST 
Trust TRUST 
Trust—the right people out there TRUST 
Trust in training to do the right thing TRUST 
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APPENDIX B: GENERAL THEMES FROM THE CODES 
Codes Count Theme 
CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 41 COMPLEXITY 
CONTROL AROUSAL 26 RPD 
OPEN TO THE ENVIRONMENT 21 COMPLEXITY 
ACTIVE ROLE IN PROCESS 20 COMPLEXITY 
MENTAL SIMULATION 18 RPD 
COLLECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 16 COMPLEXITY 
PERSPECTIVE 15 COMPLEXITY 
INFORMATION 14 COMPLEXITY 
TRUST 12 COMPLEXITY 
COMFORT IN UNKNOWN SITUATION 9 COMPLEXITY 
RISK ASSESSMENT 9 COMPLEXITY 
BOUNDARIES 8 COMPLEXITY 
OBERVATION 7 COMPLEXITY 
PRIORITIZATION 7  
INTUITION 6 COMPLEXITY 
RITUALIZATION 6 RPD 
ACTION ORIENTED 5 COMPLEXITY 
INDIRECT EXPERIENCE 5 COMPLEXITY 
REDUCE TO COMPLICATED 3 COMPLEXITY 
DISBELIEF 2  
EXPERIENCE UNDER STRESS 2 RPD 
REASSESSMENT 2  
SATICIFING 2 RPD 
ASSESSMENT 1 RPD 
CONNECTED WITH ENVIRONMENT 1 COMPLEXITY 
HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE 1 RPD 
INSTINCT 1 COMPLEXITY 
INTERACTIONS 1 COMPLEXITY 
ITEMIZATION 1 RPD 
OVERARCHING PRINCIPLE 1  
RELATIONSHIPS 1 COMPLEXITY 
TIME 1 RPD 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 73
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Axelrod, R., & Cohen, M. D. (2000). Harnessing complexity. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Bea, K., Halchin, E., Hogue, H., Kaiser, F., Love, N., McCarthy, F. X., et al. (2006). 
Federal emergency management policy changes after Hurricane Katrina: a 
summary of statutory provisions. Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service. 
 
Boin, A., Hart, P. T., Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2005). The politics of crisis 
management: Public leadership under pressure. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
County of San Diego. (2008). 2007 Firestorms After Action Report. San Diego. 
 
FEMA. (2010). ICS Review Document. Retrieved 06 27 2010 from ICS Resource 
Center: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/index.htm 
 
Gardiner, N., & Phillips, J. (2005). The London bombings: How the US and UK should 
respond. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation. 
 
Gilgun, J. (2004). Grounded theory, analytic induction and social work research. Kindle 
Version. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
 
Gladwell, M. (2005). Blink: The power of thinking without thinking. New York, NY: Bay 
Back Books. 
 
Glauser, B. B., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for 
qualitative research. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
 
Janis, I. (1989). Crucial decisions. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Keely, J. E., Fotheringham, C., & Moritz, M. A. (2004, October/November). Lessons 
learned from the October 2003 wildfires in Southern California. Journal of 
Forestry, 26–31. 
 
Klein, G. A. (1998). Sources of power. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Klein, G. A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., & Zsambok, C. E. (1995). Decision making in 
action: Models and methods. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing. 
 
Kurtz, C. F., & Snowden, D. J. (2003). The new dynamics of strategy: sense-making in a 
complex and complicated world. IBM Systems Journal, 42(3),462–483. 
 
 74
Locke, K. (2001). Grounded theory in management research. London: Sage Publications. 
 
McLennon, J., Holgate, A., & Wearing, A. (2003). Human information processing 
aspects of effective emergency incident management decision making. Human 
Factors of Decision Making in Complex Systems. Dunblane, Scotland: Ashgate 
Publishing. 
 
O'Reilly, C. A. (1980). Individuals and information overload in organizations: is more 
necessarily better? The Academy of Management Journal, 23(4), 684–696. 
 
Ramo, J. C. (2009). The age of the unthinkable: Why the new global order constantly 
surprises us and what to do about it. New York: Hachette Book Group. 
 
Snowden, D. F., & Boone, M. E. (2007, November). A leader’s framework for decision 
making. Harvard Business Review, 68–76. 
 
Thomas, C., & Beckel, B. (2005, September 21). Editorial/Opinions. Retrieved 09 04 
2009, from USA Today: http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-
09-21-common-ground_x.htm 
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2008). ICS Fundamentals Review. In F. E. 
Agency, ICS-300: Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents Student Manual (pp. 
2–24). 
 
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2001). Managing the unexpected. San Francisco: Josse-
Bass. 
 
Wilson, T. (2002). Strangers to ourselves: Discover the adaptive unconscious. 
Cambridge, MA: The Bleknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
 75
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Richard Bergin 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Dr. Christopher Bellavita 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
